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aBSTracT
We study consumers’ behavior in an experimental electricity market. subjects make decisions concerning the 
quantity of electric energy they want to consume in three different pricing environments. in the baseline fra-
mework, they decide under a system of fixed prices, invariant to consumption schedule as well as to network 
restrictions. the other two environments correspond to dynamic pricing systems combined with incentives that 
aim at cutting energy consumption in a number of selected situations characterized by high network conges-
tion. In such situations, in the first environment subjects get a bonus if they reduce their peak consumption 
below a certain level, while in the second one, consumers are sanctioned for consuming in peak times. From 
a social welfare perspective, our experimental data confirm that a dynamic system for prices is more efficient 
than a fixed one. Moreover, a dynamic scheme with sanctions, although less preferred by consumers, is more 
effective than the one with bonuses in order to reduce peak consumption. dynamic pricing with bonuses 
reaches a good balance between efficiency and consumer acceptance.
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reSuMen
estudiamos el comportamiento de los consumidores en un mercado de electricidad diseñado en el laborato-
rio. los sujetos experimentales toman decisiones sobre la cantidad de electricidad que desean consumir en 
tres contextos diferentes. En el tratamiento base, los consumidores deciden bajo un sistema de precios fijos, 
en el que el precio es invariable tanto a la franja horaria de consumo como a las restricciones de la red. los 
otros dos contextos corresponden a sistemas dinámicos de precios combinados con incentivos cuyo objetivo 
es la reducción del consumo en algunas situaciones seleccionadas caracterizadas por una alta congestión 
de la red. En estas situaciones, en el primer contexto, se bonifica la reducción del consumo en la hora punta 
por debajo de cierto nivel, mientras que en el segundo, los consumidores son sancionados por consumir en 
hora punta. Desde una perspectiva de bienestar social, nuestros datos experimentales confirman que un 
sistema de precios dinámico es más eficiente que uno fijo. Además, un esquema dinámico con sanciones, 
incluso si es menos preferido por parte de los consumidores, es más efectivo que uno en el que se bonifica 
la reducción del consumo en hora punta. Un sistema de precios dinámico con bonificaciones presenta una 
relación equilibrada entre eficiencia y nivel de aceptación por parte de los consumidores.
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InTroducTIon*
a relevant consequence of the increasing importance of environmental sustainability and 
the difficulty in modulating energy supply is that solutions are frequently searched from 
the demand side. In the case of electricity, to consume in a more efficient way implies 
not only to consume less but also to manage consumption in time. in most electrical 
systems, consumers do not receive the right signal in order to be able to make a con-
sumption time management. the reason is that, in general, the installed meters do not 
facilitate measuring and communicating consumption in real time.
 Given the evolution of electricity markets and the development of new technolo-
gies, demand response programs have recently assumed importance. Brophy Haney, 
Jamasb and pollitt (2009) present an assessment of smart metering in liberalized elec-
tricity markets by investigating the technology and the international experience. they 
confirm that there is a widespread consensus that improving the participation of the 
demand-side should be a central goal for policy in liberalized electricity markets, but the 
main barriers to greater participation are inelasticity of demand and information asym-
metry. as a conclusion, they assess that more innovative forms of metering are neces-
sary for these barriers to be overcome. However, smart metering should not be seen as 
a goal in itself but rather as a tool in promoting more active demand and innovation in 
equipment for demand-side management.
 today, it is possible to think of sophisticated demand response systems where inte-
lligent counters could allow consumers to adjust consumption in response to price sig-
nals that vary in time, leading to a more efficient electric system.1 to evaluate the impact 
of these sophisticated systems on consumers’ demand, electricity prices and market 
efficiency is presently quite difficult given that real micro-data are not available yet, apart 
from a few isolated pilot samples for which only survey information was collected. in this 
paper, we try to come close to a real demand response program by studying consumers’ 
behavior in an experimental electricity market. as already noted in detail by normann 
and ricciuti (2009), experiments are well suited to study the effects of policy regime 
changes. even if a policy maker is convinced that a new policy is superior to the status 
 *a. García-Gallego and G. sabater-Grande acknowledge financial support by the spanish min-
istry of science and innovation: eco2008-04636/econ and by Bancaja: p1-1B2010-17. i. Barreda-
tarrazona acknowledges the spanish ministry of science and innovation: eco2008-04636/econ and 
eco2010-18567, Bancaja: p1-1a2010-17, and the José castillejo Grant for visiting esri dublin in 
2009. m. pavan acknowledges financial support by the spanish ministry of education, programa de 
movilidad de Jovenes doctores extranjeros: sB2010-0084. the article has benefited greatly from com-
ments by nikolaos Georgantzís, miguel sanchez-villalba and participants at the xxvi Jornadas de 
economía industrial (valencia, 2011). 
 1 Conchado and Linares (2010) is an interesting survey of the state of the art in the quantification of 
demand response program benefits. 
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quo, experiments are useful in gathering evidence about the duration and properties of 
the transition period. this is the aim of our experimental analysis.
 an interesting aspect that has also influenced us is introduced in Fisher (2008). 
the author offers a theoretical perspective on the matter and introduces a psycho-
logical model to explain why feedback works. she holds that successful feedback 
has to capture consumer’s attention, link specific actions to their effects and activate 
various motives. one unanimous finding is that households in all countries approve 
of feedback that is more detailed and more closely linked to consumption actions. 
Furthermore, there is usually an interest in comparisons with one’s own previous 
consumption. 
 Generally speaking, the most directly related experimental literature on electricity 
markets can be classified in two main categories: field experiments and lab experi-
ments. In the first category, Battalio et al. (1979) ran an interesting field experiment 
designed to determine the effects of various price and non-price policies on electricity 
consumption. Five different price policies were tested. the results show that price poli-
cies work much better than informational policies. Faruqui and sergich (2009) review 
the most recent experimental evidence on the effectiveness of residential dynamic pri-
cing programs. Their review of 15 different field experiments on pricing reveals that the 
demand response impacts from different pilot programs vary from modest to substantial, 
largely depending on the data used in the experiments and the availability of enabling 
technologies. 
 concerning the second category, the literature provides us with single-sided as well 
as with two-sided market experiments. rassenti, smith and Wilson (2001, 2002, and 
2003) are important references on supply-side as well as both-sides active experimental 
electricity markets. they investigate several features of the california crisis and analyze 
policy aspects such as market power and the effect of demand-side bidding. For the 
case of active supply-side, the demand side is represented by a robot bidder who bids 
non-strategically up to a maximum price, analogously to the must-serve feature of the 
market. The experiments show that demand-side bidding reduces prices significantly. It 
also reduces the volatility of prices. The extreme peaks and fluctuations which also cha-
racterized the californian electricity markets were reduced. prices are generally higher 
in markets with market power but demand-side bidding can neutralize the effects of 
market power.
 more recently, adilov et al. (2004) and adilov et al. (2005) conduct, respectively, 
experiments on demand-sided and full two-sided electricity markets. the aim of both 
papers is to test the efficiency of two alternative forms of active demand-side partici-
pation. they evaluate different experimental price structures that represent end-use 
consumers who can substitute part of their usage between day and night: fixed price, 
a demand response program with fixed price and credit for reduced purchase, and 
a real time pricing system where prices are forecasted for the upcoming day/night. 
their main conclusion is that the real time program results in the greatest market 
efficiency.  
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 We present here a lab experiment that analyses the demand side of the market. 
inspired by the design of adilov et al. (2004), we consider an electricity market in which 
consumers of different types decide the quantity they want to buy under different pri-
cing systems, while the “hockey-stick”-shaped supply is exogenously given. in their 
experiment, consumption generates the same level of utility independently of the quan-
tity consumed,2 while our multi-step demand function reflects a (more realistic) decrea-
sing marginal utility of consumption. another differentiating feature of our design is that 
we allow for sanctions due to overconsumption and not only for bonuses when energy 
saving occurs. Our buyers decide in two frameworks, one with fixed and another with 
dynamic pricing. Fixed pricing constitutes our benchmark t0 treatment. Within the 
dynamic pricing setup, as commented above, we specifically test for the role of bonu-
ses as well as sanctions as demand response systems in our experimental treatments 
t1 and t2 respectively. in treatment 1, in certain selected periods of network conges-
tion, subjects receive a bonus if they reduce their peak consumption below a certain 
level. in treatment 2, in the corresponding periods, consumers are sanctioned for 
consuming in peak times. these two systems are designed in such a way as to allow 
for a neat comparison between them, given that they are aimed at motivating the same 
level of energy savings. 
 in line with the conclusions in Faruqui and George (2002) and in adilov et al. (2004), 
our data show that dynamic pricing can provide substantial net benefits to mass market 
consumers and electric utility shareholders. in particular, from a social welfare perspec-
tive, our experimental data confirm that a dynamic system of prices is more efficient than 
a fixed one. Furthermore, a dynamic pricing system combined with sanctions is more 
effective than one with bonuses in order to reduce peak consumption. However, when 
bonuses or sanctions are applied, the dynamic pricing system loses efficiency, particu-
larly in the case of sanctions.
 after each treatment, we conducted a questionnaire in order to test whether preferen-
ces change with experience.3 interestingly, when asked about their preferences, subjects 
declare to prefer the dynamic pricing system with bonus over the other systems, despite 
the fact that their gains were higher under fixed prices.
 the structure of the paper is as follows. in section 2 we describe the general fra-
mework in which our electricity market is defined. All details concerning the experi-
mental design are explained in section 3, and section 4 summarizes the main results. 
section 5 concludes. an appendix at the end includes the instructions to experimental 
subjects.
 2 their valuation is different depending on the type of energy and the time of consumption, but not on 
quantity consumed.
 3 adilov et al. (2004) also conducted a preference poll similar to ours.
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FraMeworK
in this section, we introduce all common elements characterizing the electricity market, 
and then describe each of the three market environments that correspond to our experi-
mental treatments.
The Electricity Market
the sale of electricity occurs in a competitive market over a number of periods, each 
composed of two sub-periods: peak and valley, to represent peak and off-peak usage 
respectively.4 the energy consumed can be either transferable or non-transferable. the 
latter must be consumed in a certain sub-period and in that only, and is meant to capture 
energy with a relatively inelastic demand with respect to time (heating, lighting, etc.). 
thus, non-transferable peak (valley) energy must be consumed in the peak (valley) sub-
period only. on the other hand, transferable energy (te) can be used either during the 
peak or during the valley of a same period in a substitutable manner. in this way, buyers 
can choose the quantity of te to consume in each sub-period, much as each household 
can decide to run their dishwasher or washing machine in different times of the day.
 every period, consumers must decide the quantity of transferable and non-transfera-
ble energy to buy for both the peak and the valley in order to maximize their net gains, 
calculated as the difference between their valuation of the electricity consumed and the 
money spent to buy this electricity. as common in laboratory experiments, the valuation 
of purchases is pre-assigned to buyers through an induced Utility Function (iUF), which 
determines the maximum price the consumer is willing to pay for each unit of electric 
energy. the utility provided by the use of electricity depends on the quantity consumed 
according to a discrete steps function, and is always higher for the peak than the valley. 
moreover, each consumer’s valuation of transferable energy purchases is always equal 
or lower than their valuation of non-transferable electricity.5
 there are two types of consumers in the market, one who depends more on electricity 
than the other, i.e. willing to pay a higher price for energy of any kind at every sub-period.6 
the utility function is parameterized using actual data on the electricity consumption of 
spanish households.7 these data detail the quantity of energy consumed by different 
 4 Peak and Valley closely approximate the day/night notation used in the literature. Specifically, Peak cor-
responds to the time interval 12:00-22:00. 
 5 individuals’ demand in adilov et al. (2004) is represented by a two-step value function with separate 
valuations for day and for night usage and for transferable and non-transferable electricity. 
 6 Except for the first step of the utility function in which the willingness to pay for the two types of consum-
ers coincides. This first step reflects first necessity consumption.
 7 the data were collected in the context of a project on the development of technological solutions for the 
spanish electricity network.
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types of electric appliances or uses (washing machine, heating, television, etc.) for every 
hour in the day. Each type of usage was classified as belonging to the non-transferable or 
transferable energy categories and data were aggregated to obtain total quantities which 
were then assigned utility values compatible with realistic equilibrium market prices.
 Finally, the induced utility of energy is substantially increased in correspondence with 
pre-determined “high demand periods”, when unfavorable weather conditions (such as 
a heat-wave) make everyone value electricity more, thus shifting the demand function to 
the right. more precisely, in a high demand period the utility of the consumer who is very 
dependent on electricity doubles, while that of the less dependent consumer increases 
by 40%. 
 as an illustrative example, Figure 1 shows the aggregate demand functions in the peak 
both for a normal (pd1) and for a high demand (pd2) period assuming that every consumer 
buys all transferable energy in the peak sub-period. the supply side of the market is pre-
determined (S1), varying with the network status. In every treatment, certain pre-specified 
periods are subject to a reduction in supply (s2), for instance due to a power outage, lea-
ding to higher offered prices. We call these “periods with supply restrictions”.
Figure 1.
Demand and supply curves in the peak sub-period
s1: supply curve in a normal period; s2: supply curve in a period with restrictions; pd1: Benchmark aggregate 
demand curve in the peak assuming that all transferable energy is consumed in this sub-period; pd2: peak aggre-
gate demand curve in a “high demand” period, assuming that all transferable energy is consumed in the peak.
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table 1.
 Price Intervals Forecasts
Forecasts lower Bound, peak
Upper Bound, 
peak
lower Bound, 
valley
Upper Bound, 
valley
n 0.16 0.22 0.07 0.11
Hd 0.16 0.32 0.07 0.11
sr 0.24 0.33 0.11 0.17
sr + Hd 0.24 0.42 0.11 0.17
n: normal period - period with no supply restrictions and no demand shock; Hd: High demand period - period 
with an increase in demand; sr: period with supply restrictions - period with a decrease in supply; sr + Hd: 
High demand period with supply restrictions - period with a decrease in supply and an increase in demand.
The three treatments
in the benchmark environment (treatment 0), we take as a reference the residential 
electricity market in Spain, characterized by a fixed price structure, whereby consumers 
face the same pre-determined energy price independently of the time of the day in which 
consumption takes place and of the state of the electric network. 
 in the other two treatments, however, we introduce a dynamic pricing scheme, where 
prices are determined in real time as the actual market-clearing prices. in such a scheme, 
therefore, prices are necessarily unknown at the beginning of the period, when buyers 
observe their energy valuation and the supply shock. rather, in this case consumers are 
presented with a forecast of the range of expected prices in the peak and valley sub-
periods. more precisely, this forecast for each sub-period consists of the interval in which 
the market-clearing price will fall in that sub-period if all consumers act rationally8. the 
final actual price will be closer to the lower or the upper bound of the interval depending 
on the consumers’ expectations which translate into their consumption of transferable 
and non transferable energy. in fact, buyers are made aware that if all of them choose to 
consume their stock of te during the peak (valley), the market-clearing price of electricity 
for the peak will be the upper (lower) bound of the price interval corresponding to peak, 
and simultaneously the price for the energy bought in the valley sub-period will be the 
lower (upper) bound of the price interval given for the valley.
 Knowing the price forecasts (detailed in table 1), buyers select their quantity purcha-
ses, for which they will be charged the price that clears the market. in the market, the 
 8 in the sense of choosing quantities consistent with the information about the prices provided.
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supply is simulated by software which associates a price per kWh to each level of the 
electricity aggregate demand, in every period. more precisely, we adopt a “hockey-stick” 
shaped supply function similar to the ones used in previous experiments (mount et al., 
2001; adilov et al. 2004). as can be seen in Figure 1, in this supply function the price 
increases very slowly up to a certain quantity of electricity offered, past which there is a 
substantial jump to higher prices (leading to the function assuming a shape of a hockey 
stick). this functional form intends to represent the fact that in order to increase electric 
energy above a certain level it is necessary to operate new marginal power stations 
characterized by higher operative costs. the parameterization of this supply function is 
based on the average market price of electricity per hour over 2009 up to February 2010, 
provided by the spanish electricity market operator. We assume a margin of 200% for 
the operator, and fix a cap of 0.4€ for the price in our calibration.9 to appropriately cap-
ture market behavior in situations of restricted supply, the function shifts to the left in the 
periods with restrictions, leading to an increase in prices for any production level. more 
precisely, in these periods the quantity offered at any price diminishes by 1,500 kWh and 
the supply price rises by 50% at any quantity. In this case, the price cap is fixed at 0.6€.
in treatment 1, the dynamic pricing scheme is combined with a peak time rebate, 
whereby in some of the congested periods (not normal), buyers receive a bonus for each 
kWh they save with respect to a certain individual reference level of consumption. this 
reference consumption level is calculated as the individual mean consumption in the 
previous peak sub-periods characterized by the same network status, but where no peak 
time rebate system was activated.
 on the other hand, in treatment 2 dynamic pricing is combined with critical peak 
pricing. in this case, in some of the periods in which a congestion problem arises due to 
a technical restriction in supply or an increased pressure in demand, or both, a one-off 
measure is taken consisting in a drastic rise in the price of energy. more precisely, all 
electricity consumed in the Peak of that period is charged a fixed extra amount above the 
corresponding market clearing price. 
 the implementation of these pricing mechanisms in treatments 1 and 2 is designed 
in such a way as to allow for a comparison between them. in the peak time rebate, the 
reference level is chosen such that, at the optimum, individuals choose to consume the 
same quantity of electricity as in the critical peak pricing. in other words, both schemes 
are aimed at reducing consumption by the same amount. in practice this translates 
into paying consumers a bonus equal to the extra amount charged in treatment 2 as a 
sanction to consumption per kWh of peak energy saved with respect to their reference 
consumption.
 9 this price cap could for instance represent an external option to buy extra amounts of energy from 
foreign countries.
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Experimental Design
subjects participating in the experiment were undergraduate students in Business admi-
nistration at the University Jaume i of castellón (spain). in order to allow for a within 
subjects analysis, the same set of 40 participants was engaged in all three treatments 
over one morning. the experiment was programmed in z-tree software (Fishbacher, 
2007) and was carried out in the laboratory for experimental economics (lee) of the 
University Jaume i.
 Four groups were randomly and anonymously formed with 10 buyers each, partici-
pating in the same energy market for the whole duration of the experimental session. 
as mentioned before, the energy supply was simulated by computer. in the benchmark 
experiment we fix the price of electricity for both Peak and Valley to be 12 EXCUs per 
kWh, being the excU the experimental currency Unit used in our experimental lab. 
 First, the benchmark treatment with fixed prices was repeated for 8 consecutive 
periods, followed by treatments 1 and 2, played for 22 consecutive periods each. to 
summarize, each period could be one of four possible types: a normal period (without 
any shocks to demand or supply), a high demand period (in which the valuation of energy 
is increased for all consumers and for all kinds of electricity), a period with supply res-
trictions (in which the energy supply price rises at any quantity), and a high demand 
period with supply restrictions (that combines the characteristics of the two latter cases). 
sanctions or bonuses in treatments 1 and 2 were applied in a total of six periods, two of 
each type, but never in a normal period. in treatment 2, the sanction consisted in char-
ging peak energy an extra 50 excUs above the market clearing price. in treatment 1, 
consumers were paid a bonus of 50 excUs per kWh of peak energy saved with respect 
to their weighted mean consumption of peak energy in the previous non-incentivized 
periods characterized by the same network status.
 the same sequence of events (shocks to demand and/or to supply) was used in the 
three treatments (see details in table 2, while table 3 offers a summary of the experi-
mental treatments). Before the beginning of the experimental session, subjects were ran-
domly assigned the role of consumers highly dependent or less dependent on electricity 
(in a proportion of 50-50 in each market), and received a series of instructions describing 
the general features of the experiment and the characteristics of the benchmark environ-
ment played first. They were asked not to communicate with the other players, given that 
their gains were also related to the others’ behavior. they had about 30 minutes to read 
the instructions (which can be found in the appendix), and had the opportunity to ask any 
questions they had. Specific instructions on the Peak Time Rebate and the Critical Peak 
pricing were handed out just before the start of the treatments where they were used.
 participants were not subject to any time restriction within which to make their choi-
ces. However, there was a time counter on their computer screen counting down 
seconds from 180 to 0. once the first three minutes were over, the counter remai-
ned at zero and the message “please make a decision” appeared, indicating that a 
reasonable amount of time had passed already. in this way subjects were left free 
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table 2.
Time Structure of Treatments according to Type of Period
period type of period treatment in which included
t1 (Bonus) 
t2 (sanction)
1 normal t0 / t1 / t2 no
2 supply restrictions t0 / t1 / t2 no
3 High demand t0 / t1 / t2 no
4 s. restriction + High demand t0 / t1 / t2 no
5 normal t0 / t1 / t2 no
6 s. restriction + High demand t0 / t1 / t2 Yes
7 High demand t0 / t1 / t2 Yes
8 supply restrictions t0 / t1 / t2 no
9 supply restrictions t1 / t2 Yes
10 High demand t1 / t2 no
11 s. restriction + High demand t1 / t2 no
12 normal t1 / t2 no
13 s. restriction + High demand t1 / t2 no
14 normal t1 / t2 no
15 High demand t1 / t2 Yes
16 supply restrictions t1 / t2 no
17 s. restriction + High demand t1 / t2 Yes
18 High demand t1 / t2 no
19 supply restrictions t1 / t2 Yes
20 High demand t1 / t2 no
21 supply restrictions t1 / t2 no
22 s. restriction + High demand t1 / t2 no
source: own elaboration.
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to make their choice in whatever time they needed, but were made aware of the 
amount of time judged to be reasonable to take a decision.10 We present a capture 
of the main computer screen shown to the experiment participants in Figure 2.
 Participants were also asked to fill in a questionnaire in which they had to declare 
their preference among the fixed price scheme, the dynamic pricing mechanism with 
sanctions and the dynamic pricing mechanism with bonuses.11 this preference was eli-
cited at the end of each treatment, so that it was possible to keep track of the changes 
in individual preferences due to the subject having increased information and practical 
experience of more mechanisms each time.
 the experimental session lasted approximately 5 hours, including two 30’ breaks bet-
ween treatments to allow the students to rest. participants received a unique payment as 
a function of the gains obtained in one of the three treatments, randomly chosen from a 
draw by hand in front of them. this random lottery incentive mechanism avoids undesi-
red income effects between treatments, whereby students’ behavior over time could be 
influenced by their accumulated gains.
 payments were privately handed out in cash to each student at the end of the ses-
sion. students were paid on the basis of how much they had gained proportionally to the 
total gains of the subjects of their type in the experiment. Average earnings were 86€, 
about 17€ per hour dedicated to the experiment.
 10 it is important to note that subjects hardly ever used up the 3 minutes, only some of them spent some more 
time the first period in which they were faced with a new pricing scheme.
 11  Definitions of the two dynamic pricing schemes (with bonuses and with sanctions) were presented in 
the questionnaire itself (see instructions in the appendix).
table 3.
Summary of Experimental Treatments
treatment prices Bonus sanction n. of periods markets subjects
t0 Fixed -- -- 8 4 40
t1 dynamic Yes no 22 4 40
t2 dynamic no Yes 22 4 40
total 52 12 40
source: own elaboration.
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Figure 2.
 Screenshot from the experiment
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reSulTS
table 4 presents descriptive statistics of energy quantities consumed in all experimen-
tal treatments.12 observe that participants are highly sensitive to the different types of 
periods, sub-periods, and energy. Besides, the variability among participants’ decisions 
appears to be moderate.
 Benchmark Environment (T0). Generally speaking, individuals of both types decided 
optimally after one period of learning. as an example, Figure 3 illustrates the observed 
mean consumption of non-transferable and transferable energy versus their predicted 
level in the peak sub-period, and for the three treatments.13 Focusing on the top left 
box of each panel, representing the benchmark case, we can observe that average 
non-transferable and transferable energy consumed quantities are within the ranges of 
optimal choices.14
Result 1: Experimental subjects behave optimally in the benchmark environment.
By construction, periods with supply restrictions do not change consumers’ behavior in 
the regime with fixed prices, and consumption of all types of energy increases in high 
demand periods.
 The Effect of Dynamic Pricing. in treatments 1 and 2, the dynamic pricing mecha-
nism is introduced whereby individuals make their consumption choices knowing only 
the expected range of energy prices. Going back to the boxes t1 and t2 of Figure 3, we 
observe that, in the periods with no incentives (bonuses or sanctions), observed con-
sumption is always within the ranges of its optimal level, considerably lower than obser-
ved consumption under the fixed prices regime (T0). That is, subjects behave optimally 
even in the presence of a more complex pricing mechanism, an indication that they are 
able to understand this mechanism and adjust to it (we will comment later on the effects 
of incentives). participants in the experiment by adilov et al. (2004) also demonstrated 
their ability as buyers to solve a non-trivial inter-temporal optimization problem in their 
real time pricing system. 
 
 12 notice that, given that there are only 10 buyers in our electricity market, each of them consumes a 
quantity of energy representing the demand of about 700 average real consumers. 
 13 in the Figures and tables we show the behavior of the more energy dependent consumer, given that no 
qualitative difference is observed between the two types of consumers. 
 14 Apart from the first period when learning did not take place yet.
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table 4.
 Descriptive Statistics of transferable and non-transferable 
energy consumed by type of consumer
mean energy consumed 
(standard deviation) more energy dependent consumer less energy dependent consumer
tr
ea
tm
en
t
period pnte vnte pte vte pnte vnte pte vte
t0
n 5,897(357)
3,291
(161)
776
(51)
206
(51)
3,860
(127)
2,154
(84)
614
(20)
139
(20)
sr 6,064(128)
3,324
(58)
76
(0)
220
(16)
3,906
(68)
2,174
(55)
587
(144)
100
(0)
Hd 6,345(124)
3,452
(55)
760
(0)
224
(0)
3,920
(73)
2,165
(86)
610
(0)
144
(0)
sr + Hd 6,251(414)
3,407
(186)
760
(0)
224
(0)
3,935
(35)
2,187
(31)
618
(32)
135
(32)
t1
/t
2
n 5,807(161)
3,361
(47)
499
(255)
478
(256)
3,727
(96)
2,193
(55)
413
(233)
339
(231)
sr 5,571(132)
3,275
(53)
423
(248)
552
(253)
3,594
(95)
2,135
(48)
387
(236)
360
(235)
Hd 6,043(153)
3,474
(50)
572
(252)
403
(254)
3,758
(106)
2,212
(50)
449
(230)
304
(229)
sr + Hd 5,857(173)
3,387
(65)
559
(259)
415
(257)
3,677
(87)
2,196
(43)
388
(238)
365
(238)
sr + B 5,265(377)
3,274
(61)
424
(273)
531
(275)
3,378
(208)
2,134
(52)
251
(213)
501
(213)
Hd + B 5,614(401)
3,481
(41)
386
(270)
529
(296)
3,521
(215)
2,211
(51)
291
(240)
446
(243)
sr + Hd + B 5,617(359)
3,391
(53)
463
(287)
495
(277)
3,543
(198)
2,178
(46)
312
(239)
431
(245)
sr + s 4,801(375)
3,272
(60)
131
(76)
844
(72)
3,162
(221)
2,109
(80)
120
(120)
631
(218)
Hd + s 5,444(367)
3,477
(36)
144
(77)
828
(71)
3,362
(285)
2,202
(70)
111
(97)
638
(94)
sr + Hd + s 5,351(354)
3,368
(90)
131
(83)
842
(78)
3,363
(282)
2,177
(80)
132
(147)
619
(147)
pnte: peak non-transferable energy; vnte: valley non-transferable energy; pte: peak transferable 
energy; vte: valley transferable energy; n: normal period; sr: period with supply restrictions; Hd: High 
demand period; B: Bonus; s: sanctions.
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 table 5 presents the results of Wilcoxon tests comparing the average individual 
energy consumption under different regimes.15 One first result we draw from these tests 
is that Peak energy consumption (both transferable and not) is significantly reduced 
under the dynamic pricing scheme with respect to the fixed prices one for any kind of net-
work status (see comparison Fp-dp in the table). this decrease in energy consumption 
in the Peak sub-period reflects the fact that the Treatment 1 market-clearing price in peak 
times would always be higher than 12 cents (the fixed price in T0), for any type of period 
(table 6 presents the Wilcoxon tests on differences between prices). moreover, subjects 
decide to shift part of the transferable electricity consumption to the valley, a sign that 
they expect lower prices in that sub-period.16
 in general, energy consumption in valley increases with dynamic prices under any 
network status, but not by much, so that total energy consumed is lower under dynamic 
pricing than under fixed prices (last column in Table 5).
 15 the Wilcoxon test is appropriate for small non-normal data distributions in matched samples experi-
mental designs.
 16 We can see in the VEP column in Table 6 that this expectation is fulfilled only in normal periods.
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Figure 3.
Average Peak energy consumption in a high demand period with supply restrictions 
Dashed lines: equilibrium interval of energy consumption in the market without incentives; solid 
lines: equilibrium interval of energy consumption in the market with incentives (bonuses or sanc-
tions); periods 6 and 17 are the ones with incentives.  
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table 5.
 Wilcoxon test on differences between mean consumed 
quantities by subject, for the more energy dependent consumers
co
mp
ar
iso
n
period pnte vnte pte vte pe ve e
Fp
-d
p
n 0.005 (+) 0.040 (-) 0.000 (+) 0.000 (-) 0.001 (+) 0.000 (-) 0.025 (+)
sr 0.000 (+) 0.005 (+) 0.000 (+) 0.000 (-) 0.000 (+) 0.000 (-) 0.000 (+)
Hd 0.000 (+) 0.124 (-) 0.001 (+) 0.002 (-) 0.000 (+) 0.001 (-) 0,000 (+)
sr + Hd 0.001 (+) 0.021 (+) 0.001 (+) 0.001 (-) 0.001 (+) 0.020 (-) 0.001 (+)
dp
(t
1)
-d
pB
sr 0.001 (+) 0.878 (+) 0.649 (-) 0.534 (+) 0.010 (+) 0.481 (+) 0.001 (+)
Hd 0.001 (+) 0.044 (-) 0.035 (+) 0.072 (-) 0.000 (+) 0.049 (-) 0.001 (+)
sr + Hd 0.001 (+) 0.933 (-) 0.362 (+) 0.362 (-) 0.003 (+) 0.492 (-) 0.001 (+)
dp
(t
2)
-d
ps
sr 0.000 (+) 1.000(=) 0.000 (+) 0.000 (-) 0.000 (+) 0.000 (-) 0.000 (+)
Hd 0.000 (+) 0.458(+) 0.000 (+) 0.000 (-) 0.000 (+) 0.000 (-) 0.000 (+)
sr + Hd 0.000 (+) 0.173(+) 0.000 (+) 0.000 (-) 0.000 (+) 0.000 (-) 0.000 (+)
dp
B-
dp
s
sr 0.000 (+) 0.739(+) 0.000 (+) 0.000 (-) 0.000(+) 0.000 (-) 0.000 (+)
Hd 0.005 (+) 0.596(+) 0.000 (+) 0.000 (-) 0.002(+) 0.000 (-) 0.020 (+)
sr + Hd 0.003 (+) 0.131(+) 0.000 (+) 0.000 (-) 0.000(+) 0.000 (-) 0.004 (+)
In dark gray: significantly positive differences at 5% level; in clear gray: significantly negative differences at 
5% level; Fp: Fixed prices; dp: dynamic prices; dpB: dynamic prices with Bonus; dps: dynamic prices with 
sanctions; Fp-dp: the test is on the difference between mean individual consumption under the Fixed price 
regime and the mean individual consumption under the dynamic pricing scheme, etc.; pnte: peak non-
transferable energy; vnte: valley non-transferable energy; pte: peak transferable energy; vte: valley 
transferable energy; pe: peak energy; ve: valley energy; e: total energy; n: normal period; sr: period with 
supply restrictions; Hd: High demand period.
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Result 2: Compared to the fixed prices structure, the dynamic pricing mechanism has 
the effect of reducing the consumption in Peak times and slightly increasing it in Valley, 
leading to an overall saving of total energy consumed.
last, in treatments 1 and 2, where prices are allowed to change, a period characterized 
by a supply restriction has the effect of increasing prices and reducing energy consump-
tion, so that the market is more efficient than in the fixed price case. Figure 4 compa-
res average consumption between normal and supply restrictions periods for the more 
energy dependent consumers, in the three treatments. as commented above, supply 
restrictions have no effect under fixed prices. In contrast, under dynamic pricing (T1 
and t2) the quantity of energy consumed in the periods with supply restrictions is much 
lower than the amount consumed in the normal periods, always in the range of optimal 
behavior at least when no incentives are in place.
 Bonuses versus Sanctions. Both bonuses and sanctions, when applied, have the 
desired effect of decreasing consumption in peak times. if we compare in table 5 the 
non-incentivized periods in t1 (t2) to those periods of the same type in which a bonus 
(sanction) is in place, we can observe that peak non-transferable energy consumption 
is significantly reduced in the latter case, for any type of period. From the top panel of 
Figure 3 we can clearly see this effect at work, although we can notice that subjects 
need one learning period (especially in t1, with the bonus) to adjust to the change in the 
market. comparing the observed mean non-transferable energy consumption levels with 
the corresponding predicted ones in the Figure, the observed reduction due to a bonus 
results less than optimal. in treatment t2, in contrast, sanctions appear to be more effec-
tive, given that the optimal amount of energy consumption is always reached at least in 
the second period in which the incentive is in place. this pattern is observed for every 
type of consumer and all incentivized periods.17
 thus, the critical peak pricing (dps) system appears to be far more effective in 
decreasing the demand in the peak sub-period than the peak time rebate (dpB), des-
pite the fact that the two incentives were designed to induce the same energy savings. 
This result is confirmed in the bottom section of Table 5 (DPB-DPS): mean individual con-
sumption of Peak electric energy is significantly lower under the system with sanctions 
than in the one with bonuses. consumption of valley energy does not receive any bonus 
or sanction, so that valley non-transferable energy in particular is not affected by these 
incentives. Bonuses and sanctions have no effect on or slightly increase the amount of 
transferable energy consumed in valley (column vte in table 5). 
 17 additional graphs are available upon request.
ris, vol. 70. extra 1, 127-165, marZo 2012. issn: 0034-9712  DOI 10.3989/rIS.2011.10.30
demand response in experimental electricitY  marKets • 145 
Figure 4.
Average energy consumption in normal and supply restrictions periods
Dashed lines: equilibrium interval of non-transferable energy consumption in the market without incentives; 
solid lines: equilibrium interval of non-transferable energy consumption in the market with incentives (bonuses 
or sanctions); periods 9 and 19 are the ones with incentives. 
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Result 3: Both bonuses and sanctions significantly reduce consumption of energy in 
Peak times, nonetheless sanctions are more effective. Furthermore, these savings do 
not translate into much higher off-peak consumption.
As far as prices are concerned, both bonuses and sanctions lead to a significant decrease 
in the market-clearing price of electricity in peak times (column pep, rows dp(t1)-dpB 
and dp(t2)-dps in table 6). only the sanctions, however, have the effect of generating 
a sufficiently high level of transferability of energy towards the Valley as to significantly 
increase the prices in this sub-period. this effect is observed for every state of the net-
work under sanctions (column vep, row dp(t2)-dps in table 6), while bonuses do not 
lead to any significant changes in Valley prices.
 Consumer and producer surplus. The dynamic pricing mechanism significantly redu-
ces consumer surplus with respect to the fixed prices environment. The difference bet-
ween mean consumer surpluses in these two treatments is significant, as can be seen in 
table 7, which shows the related Wilcoxon test.
 Within the treatments with dynamic prices, the system with bonuses leads to an 
increase in consumer surplus (see row dp(t1)-dpB in table 7) due to the transfer more 
than compensating the decrease in consumption it produces. sanctions, on the other 
hand, significantly decrease consumer surplus (row DP(T2)-DPS in the Table), given that 
the penalty and the reduction in consumption reinforce each other. as an extreme case, 
Figure 5 presents the consumer surplus in the periods with supply restrictions for the 
three treatments. the negative effect of the sanctions in this case is such that consumer 
surplus falls close to zero, while bonuses slightly increase consumer welfare with respect 
to non-incentivized periods. 
 the effects on producer surplus go in the opposite direction. producers are better off 
in the presence of dynamic prices. Bonuses reduce producer surplus, while sanctions 
have an ambiguous effect, since the gains from the sanctions are counterbalanced by the 
decrease in sales.18 For example, Figure 6 shows the case of the high demand periods, 
where the bonuses significantly reduce producer surplus, while sanctions do not have a 
clear-cut effect.
 adding together all these effects on consumer and producer surpluses, overall wel-
fare is higher under the dynamic pricing mechanism than under fixed prices, consistently 
with the results in adilov et al. (2004). However, if bonuses or sanctions are applied, the 
dynamic pricing system loses efficiency (with sanctions being the worse in terms of total 
surplus). table 8 presents the results of a Wilcoxon test on the difference between the 
mean total welfare under various regimes.  
 18 results of the Wilcoxon test are available from the authors upon request.
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table 6.
Wilcoxon test on differences between equilibrium market prices 
comparison period pep vep
Fp-dp n 0.034a (-) 0.023b (+)
sr 0.034a (-) 0.023b (-)
Hd 0.028a (-) 0.046 (-)
sr + Hd 0.033a (-) 0.046 (-)
dp(t1)-dpB sr 0.034c (+) 1.000 (=)
Hd 0.028c (+) 0.317 (-)
Hd + sr 0.034c (+) 0.317 (-)
dp(t2)-dps sr 0.034d (+) 0.046 (-)
Hd 0.028d (+) 0.046 (-)
Hd + sr 0.034d (+) 0.046 (-)
In dark gray: significantly positive differences at 5%; in clear gray: significantly negative differences at 5%; FP: 
Fixed prices; dp: dynamic prices; dpB: dynamic prices with Bonus; dps: dynamic prices with sanctions; 
Fp-dp: the test is on the difference between the Fixed price and the equilibrium price under the dynamic 
pricing scheme, etc.; pep: peak energy price; vep: valley energy price; n: normal period; sr: period with 
supply restrictions; Hd: High demand period.
notes:
a: Unilateral Hypothesis: pep (Fp) < pep (dp);
b: Unilateral Hypothesis: vep (Fp) > vep (dp); 
c: Unilateral Hypothesis: pep (dp) > pep (dpB); 
d: Unilateral Hypothesis: pep (dp) > pep (dps).
ris, vol. 70. extra 1, 127-165, marZo 2012. issn: 0034-9712  DOI 10.3989/rIS.2011.10.30
148 • ivÁn Barreda-tarraZona, aUrora GarcÍa-GalleGo, marina pavan and Gerardo saBater-Grande
table 7.
Wilcoxon test on differences between mean consumer 
surpluses, for the more energy dependent consumers
comparison period pcs vcs tcs
Fp-dp
n 0.001 (+) 0.000 (-) 0.073 (+)
sr 0.000 (+) 0.000 (-) 0.000 (+)
Hd 0.000 (+) 0.001 (-) 0.000 (+)
sr + Hd 0.000 (+) 0.002 (-) 0.001 (+)
dp(t1)-dpB
sr 0.000 (-) 0.198 (+) 0.001 (-)
Hd 0.681 (-) 0.679 (-) 0.156 (-)
sr + Hd 0.012 (-) 0.943 (-) 0.001 (-)
dp(t2)-dps
sr 0.000 (+) 0.000(+) 0.000 (+)
Hd 0.000 (+) 0.003(+) 0.000 (+)
sr + Hd 0.000 (+) 0.001(+) 0.000 (+)
dpB-dps
sr 0.000 (+) 0.002(+) 0.000 (+)
Hd 0.000 (+) 0.002(+) 0.000 (+)
sr + Hd 0.000 (+) 0.001(+) 0.000 (+)
In dark gray: significantly positive differences at 5%; in clear gray: significantly negative differences at 5%; FP: 
Fixed prices; dp: dynamic prices; dpB: dynamic prices with Bonus; dps: dynamic prices with sanctions; 
Fp-dp: the test is on the difference between mean consumer surplus under the Fixed price regime and mean 
consumer surplus under the dynamic pricing scheme, etc.; pcs: peak consumer surplus; vcs: valley 
consumer surplus; tcs: total consumer surplus; n: normal period; sr: period with supply restrictions; 
Hd: High demand period.
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table 8.
Wilcoxon test comparing total welfare 
comparison period pW vW tW
Fp-dp
n 0.034a (-) 0.034a (-) 0.034a (-)
sr 0.034a (-) 0.034a (-) 0.034a (-)
Hd 0.034a (-) 0.034a (-) 0.034a (-)
sr + Hd 0.034a (-) 0.034a (-) 0.034a (-)
dp(t1)-dpB
sr 0.034b (+) 0.072b (-) 0.034b (+)
Hd 0.034b (+) 0.072b (-) 0.034b (+)
sr + Hd 0.034b (+) 0.307b(-) 0.034b (+)
dp(t2)-dps
sr 0.034c (+) 0.034c (+) 0.034c (+)
Hd 0.034c (+) 0.034c (+) 0.034c (+)
sr + Hd 0.034c (+) 0.034c (+) 0.034c (+)
dpB-dps
sr 0.034d (+) 0.034d (+) 0.034d (+)
Hd 0.034d (+) 0.034d (+) 0.034d (+)
sr + Hd 0.034d (+) 0.034d (+) 0.034d (+)
in dark gray significantly positive differences at 5%; in clear gray: significantly negative differences at 5%; FP: 
Fixed prices; dp: dynamic prices; dpB: dynamic prices with Bonus; dps: dynamic prices with sanctions; 
Fp-dp: the test is on the difference between mean total surplus under the Fixed price regime and mean total 
surplus under the dynamic pricing scheme, etc.; pW: peak Welfare; vW: valley Welfare; tW: total Welfare; 
n: normal period; sr: period with supply restrictions; Hd: High demand period.
notes: 
a: Unilateral hypothesis: pW/vW/tW (Fp) < pW/vW/tW (dp);
b: Unilateral hypothesis: pW/vW/tW (dp) > pW/vW/tW (dpB);
c: Unilateral hypothesis: pW/vW/tW (dp) > pW/vW/tW (dps);
d: Unilateral hypothesis: pW/vW/tW (dpB) > pW/vW/tW (dps).
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Figure 5.
Consumer surplus in periods with supply restrictions
Figure 6.
 Producer surplus in high demand periods
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periods 9 and 19 are the ones with incentives.
periods 7 and 15 are the ones with incentives.
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Result 4: The most efficient system is the dynamic pricing without incentives. 
Preferences over incentives. Figure 7 presents the evolution of the subjects’ preferences 
on pricing mechanisms, resulting from the survey filled in by participants at the end of 
each experimental treatment. After reading a definition of the two more complex dynamic 
pricing mechanisms, subjects were asked to choose their preferred regime among these 
two and the fixed pricing. As we can see from the Figure, 47% of the subjects declare 
to prefer the dynamic pricing scheme with bonus even in the first survey, before having 
experienced this scheme, with the rest choosing fixed prices. The percentage of indivi-
duals preferring the dynamic pricing mechanism with bonus then increases to 62.5% 
after their experience with the system in t1, and up to 85% after having participated in 
the sanctions treatment t2. 
 Interestingly, subjects prefer dynamic pricing with bonuses over fixed prices despite 
the fact that they gain more in the latter scheme. Figure 8 shows the mean gains in each 
of the three experimental treatments: average earnings in t0 were about 1,600 excUs, 
in t1 about 1,500 excUs, and in t2 almost 1,200 excUs.
Figure 7.
Subjects’ preferences over pricing system
source: own elaboration.
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Result 5: Subjects prefer the dynamic pricing mechanism with bonuses, especially after 
experiencing it, and even more after experiencing the mechanism with sanctions, and 
despite the fact that their earnings were higher under the fixed prices regime.
this result shows that individuals value factors other than earnings to assess a pricing 
mechanism. in particular, they seem to attribute relevance to being able to receive fee-
dback in terms of prices from the energy market, thus having a more active role in mana-
ging their own demand. also they obviously seem to prefer positive reinforcement rather 
than sanctions.
concluSIonS
our paper analyzes consumers’ behavior in an experimental electricity market under 
three different pricing mechanisms. subjects choose the quantity of electric energy they 
want to consume in peak and off-peak times, obeying certain restrictions on transfera-
bility of energy usage between the two sub-periods in a day. in the baseline framework 
Figure 8.
 Mean gain by treatment
source: own elaboration.
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the energy price is fixed, that is, invariant to consumption schedule as well as to meteo-
rological variations and network restrictions. this is the system used in most real electric 
consumption tariff schemes. the other two environments correspond to dynamic pricing 
mechanisms which can be used to actively manage electricity demand. the dynamic pri-
cing schemes are characterized by the existence of a prediction on the expected prices 
that is communicated to the consumers before submitting their energy bids. Under the 
first environment, in some periods subjects get a bonus if they reduce their peak con-
sumption below a certain level. Under the second, in some periods consumers are sanc-
tioned for consuming in peak times. these two systems are designed in such a way as 
to allow for a neat comparison between them, given that they are aimed at motivating the 
same level of energy savings. 
 individuals optimally adjust their behavior to different market environments, thus 
showing that they understand even the more complex dynamic pricing mechanisms with 
very short learning time (one period). Compared to the system with fixed prices, dynamic 
pricing is shown to lead to higher overall energy savings and is confirmed to be the most 
efficient system, leading to higher social welfare. The system with sanctions is by far the 
most effective one in cutting energy consumption in periods with exceptional congestion 
of the network (e.g. due to power outages or extreme weather conditions). subjects 
declare to prefer the dynamic pricing system with bonus over the other systems, despite 
the fact that their gains were higher under fixed prices.
 these results suggest that there is room for implementing active dynamic pricing 
mechanisms in real markets, given that they are fast and easy to learn and consumers 
might even prefer them to the dominant actual situation. at the same time, the higher 
efficiency of this system when compared to fixed pricing benefits both the environment 
and the utilities.
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aPPendIx
Instructions (Translated from Spanish)
this experiment is part of a study over the decision-making process in electricity markets, 
and will be composed of three parts, a, B and c.19 in each part, you will assume the role 
of a consumer who needs to consume electricity for your daily activities.
 the choices you will make during the experiment will determine your gains and we 
are going to reward you in cash depending on these choices, according to the following 
rule: we are going to pay you depending on the gains you obtained in one of the 3 parts 
of the experiment, randomly chosen through a draw performed by hand in front of all the 
participants.   
 please, do not try to communicate with any other participant for the whole duration of 
the experimental session.  
General Information
You are one of 10 buyers in the electricity market. the sale of electric energy will take 
place in various sequential periods. each period will be composed of two sub-periods, 
peaK and valleY, corresponding to the daytime and the nighttime respectively.
 Your utility from electric energy tells you how much you value the consumption of 
electricity. this utility will change depending on the quantity of energy consumption and 
on whether you are consuming during the peaK or during the valleY. additionally, the 
utility provided by the consumption of electricity will be different in certain periods, charac-
terized by unfavorable weather conditions, which we will call HiGH demand periods. 
the utility from your electricity consumption will show on your computer screen in each 
period.  
 Figure a is an example of the computer screen you will see each period.
 in the experiment, you will receive money for the electricity units you decide to buy. 
Your gains in any period are given by the utility provided by the electricity you consume in 
each block, from which you subtract the amount you paid for the energy consumed, with 
one exception. This exception refers to the first block of non-transferable energy in your 
utility function, which will be considered as a minimUm consUmption block, providing 
no gains.
 Thus, you will find it in your interest to consume electric energy as long as the utility 
you obtain from it is higher or equal to the price you pay for it.
 moreover, in certain periods, called periods with sUpplY restrictions, there 
might be energy supply restrictions motivating an increase in the costs of energy provi-
 19 parts a, B and c correspond to treatments t0, t1 and t2 respectively.
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Figure a.
         Example of screenshot from the experiment 
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sion. last, a HiGH demand period with sUpplY restrictions combines the 
characteristics of a HiGH demand period and a period with sUpplY restric-
tions. 
period type description
normal period standard situation.
High demand period adverse weather conditions. ex: -20°c.
period with supply restrictions reduction in the energy supply. ex: electricity outage.
High demand period with supply restrictions combination of the two situations above.
the following terms will be used to describe the utility given to you by the consumption 
of electricity:
The peak non-transferable energy is the electricity that can be consumed only during 
the peaK sub-periods.
The peak non-transferable energy utility represents your valuation of each block of 
energy consumption in the peak sub-period.
The maximum quantity of peak non-transferable energy represents the maximum 
quantity of energy that you can consume in a peaK sub-period. any quantity of peak 
energy above this maximum level gives you zero utility.
The valley non-transferable energy is the electricity that can be consumed only during 
the valleY sub-periods.
The valley non-transferable energy utility represents your valuation of each block of 
valley energy consumption.
The maximum quantity of valley standard energy represents the maximum quantity 
of energy that you can consume in a valleY sub-period. any quantity of valley energy 
above this maximum level gives you zero utility.
Transferable energy is the electricity that can be consumed during the peaK sub-peri-
ods or valleY sub-periods.
The utility of the transferable energy consumed during a peaK (valleY) sub-period 
represents your valuation of each block of transferable energy consumed during the 
peaK (valleY) sub-periods.
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The maximum quantity of transferable energy represents the maximum quantity 
of transferable energy that you can consume in a period. any quantity of transferable 
energy above this maximum level gives you zero utility.
Note: if you decide to consume a quantity x of transferable energy in a peaK sub-period, 
then the maximum quantity of transferable energy that you will be able to consume in the 
following valleY sub-period is equal to the maximum quantity of transferable energy 
minus x. 
in each period, information on the utility you receive corresponding to each consumption 
block for each type of energy will appear on your computer screen. additionally, you will 
have access to a calculator so that you can carry out the calculations you find useful. 
every period, your gains are given by the utility provided by the energy you consume 
minus the amount spent to buy this energy. the price of electricity will be determined in 
each period. the unit of account in the experimental session will be the excU. 
 as an example, assume you consume 5 units of peak energy in a peaK sub-period, 
with a utility for this energy equal to 30 excUs per unit. moreover, you consume 6 units 
of transferable energy, with a utility of 20 excUs per unit, and assume that the price of 
electricity is 10 EXCUs per unit. In this case, your gains would be (5·30 EXCUs) + (6·20 
EXCUs) – (11·10 EXCUs) = 160 EXCUs.
 the amount of money you’ll get will be obtained calculating your gains according to 
an exchange rate EXCUs/€.  
Specific Information: Experiment Part A (T0)
in this part of the experiment, the price of electricity will always be the same, equal 
to 0.12 excUs per unit, during all sub-periods peaK and valleY. as you know, the 
underlying costs of energy provision vary in certain PERIODS with SUPPLY RESTRIC-
TIONS. However, in this part of the experiment, this change in costs does not affect 
the price you pay for energy. Your task is to choose the quantity of (peak and valley) 
non-transferable and transferable energy you wish to consume in each period. in order 
to make your decision easier, in each period you will be given information on the total 
quantity of each type of energy consumed in each sub-period, the expenditure incurred 
for your purchases, and the corresponding net gains (utility minus expenditure) obtained 
with your consumption. additionally, you will receive information on your accumulated net 
gains up to that period.
the following is an example of the screen you will be able to see at the end of each 
period:
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Figure B.
         Example of table summarizing the net gains from your decisions 
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InSTrucTIonS: exPerIMenT ParTS B (T1) and c (T2)
in this part of the experiment the price of electricity will be unknown. in each period, the 
price will be determined by the participants’ choices as we explain in the following. Before 
each period begins, you will be given an indicative forecast of the energy prices in 
the peaK and valleY sub-periods. this forecast will consist of an interval of prices for 
each sub-period. The final price will be closer to the minimum or to the maximum price 
in the interval depending on the consumption of transferable energy in each sub-period. 
if all consumers choose to consume all the transferable energy in the peaK (valleY) 
sub-period, the price for the energy bought in peaK will be the upper (lower) bound of 
the price interval corresponding to the peaK, and the price for the energy bought in the 
valleY will be the lower (upper) bound of the price interval given for the valleY. the 
more (less) energy is transferred to the valleY, the more (less) the aggregate demand 
in the valleY and the less (more) the aggregate demand in the peaK: as a conse-
quence, the higher (lower) the price for the valleY and the lower (higher) the price for 
the peaK.
 Knowing the forecast for both sub-periods, you will have to choose the quantities 
of energy, non-transferable as well as transferable, to consume in the peaK and in the 
valleY. 
 in order to determine the price, we add up the electricity demand of all consumers in 
the market. We then buy the electricity from those sellers that provide it for the cheapest 
prices. the price for the period will be the highest selling price offered to provide the 
demanded energy. 
 as an example, assume that buyers wish to purchase 10 units of electricity in total. 
suppose that a seller sells 4 units at 1 excU each, a second seller offers 7 units at 2 
excUs each, and a third seller offers 5 units at 3 excUs each. Four of the 10 units will 
be bought from the first seller and the remaining 6 units from the second one. In this case, 
the price in the period will be 2 excUs, which is the highest offered price necessary to 
satisfy the demand.
 if consumers wished to purchase 12 units of electricity, one of the two additional units 
would be bought from the second seller, but the other one would have to be purchased 
from the third one, the consequence being that now the price of energy would be 3 
excUs, the highest price necessary to satisfy the demand.
 the prices offered by the sellers will be simulated by computer, and will not differ 
among periods, with the exception of the period with sUpplY restrictions, when 
the supply prices will be higher.
 [Only for Part B (T1):] additionally, in some peaK sub-periods a bonus will be imple-
mented which will consist in paying you an extra 0.5 excUs for each energy unit you 
consume under a certain reference level. this reference level will be based on your 
previous peak consumption in periods of the same type. 
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 [Only for Part C (T2):] additionally, in some peaK sub-periods a sanction will be 
implemented which will consist in charging for each energy unit you consume an extra 
0.5 excUs above the equilibrium market price in that period.
 
Given this pricing scheme, your task is to choose the quantity of (peaK and valleY) 
non-transferable and transferable energy you wish to consume in each period. in order 
to make your decision easier, in each period you will be given information on the total 
quantity of each type of energy consumed in each sub-period, the expenditure incurred 
for your purchases, and the corresponding net gains (utility minus expenditure) obtained 
with your consumption. additionally, you will receive information on your accumulated net 
gains up to that period.
 the following is an example of the screens you will be able to see when having to 
take a decision and at the end of the period [Part B (T1)]:
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Figure c.
         Example of screenshot from part B (T1) 
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Figure d.
             Example of table summarizing the net gains from decisions taken in Part B (T1) 
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QueSTIonnaIre on PreFerenceS 
in the following, we present a brief description of two alternative markets for electric 
energy: dynamic prices with sanctions (dps) and dynamic prices with Bonuses (dpB). 
[Only for Part A (T0)] Based on your experience in the fixed prices system, please indi-
cate which alternative you prefer.
[Only for Part B (T1)] Based on your experience in the two mechanisms, please indicate 
which alternative you prefer.
[Only for Part C (T2)] We are at the end of the experiment. Based on your experience in 
the three mechanisms, please indicate which alternative you prefer.  
Dynamic Prices with Sanctions (DPS)
in this scheme, price of electricity is unknown. the price of each period will be determined 
by the equilibrium between demand and supply in the market. Before each period begins, 
you will be given an illUstrative forecast of the energy price for each sub-period, 
peaK and valleY. this forecast consists of an interval of prices for each sub-period. 
additionally, in some peaK sub-period, a sanction will be put in place which will consist of 
charging an additional amount per unit of energy on top of the market price in the peaK. 
Dynamic Prices with Bonuses (DPB)
in this scheme, price of electricity is unknown. the price of each period will be determined 
by the equilibrium between demand and supply in the market. Before each period begins, 
you will be given an illUstrative forecast of the energy price for each sub-period, 
peaK and valleY. this forecast consists of an interval of prices for each sub-period. 
additionally, in some peaK sub-period, you will be given an extra reward for each energy 
unit you consume under a certain reference level. this reference level will be based on 
your previous peak consumption in periods of the same type. 
please point out which alternative you prefer among:
1) Fixed prices
2) Dynamic prices with sanctions
3) Dynamic prices with bonuses
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